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THE NEW TRIAL PROCEDURE ON CONFESSIONS
IN NEW YORK
Arthur J. Paonet
The United States Supreme Court last summer threw another chain
around the reluctantly conforming apparatus of state criminal procedure.
By finding yet another reason to review thousands of state convictions,
this time in at least seventeen states and six federal circuits, the Court is
continuing to push for uniformity of state and local criminal procedure to
the evolving federal standard. Questions are being raised as to whether
state and local courts are not already mere adjuncts to the federal system
in trying criminal cases.
In Jackson v. Denno1 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the
procedure by which New York managed confessions in criminal cases,
a procedure it had only eleven years before thoroughly approved The
Jackson case arose on a federal habeas corpus proceeding in a two year
old conviction and the Court made it obvious that the new rule would be
retroactive,3 thus applying to thousands of convictions in the twenty-
three jurisdictions following the New York procedure.' The New York
Court of Appeals concluded as much in its conforming decree, People v.
Huntley,' where it also expanded its coram nobis remedy, thereby re-
taining the minimal dignity of reviewing its own prior criminal convic-
tions.6
According to pre-Jackson procedure in New York, the trial court had
to hold a preliminary examination or voir dire if any question was raised
concerning the voluntariness of a confession offered in evidence. The court
was to exclude the confession only if as a matter of law the confession was
involuntary, that is, under no circumstances could the confession be
voluntary. If the court found that there was a disputable issue as to
t A.B. 1961, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1964, Cornell University. Member of the
Board of Editors of the Cornell Law Quarterly. Law Assistant, N.Y. State Supreme Court,
Appellate Division (3d Dep't). Member of the New York Bar.
1 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
2 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
3 Supra note 1, at 388-91; see id. at 406 (Black, J., dissenting); Redlich, "Consti-
tutional Law, 1964 Survey of N.Y. Law," 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 211, 217 (1964).
4 For a listing of these jurisdictions, compare the Appendix to the majority opinion with
the Appendix A-IH and B-I of Justice Black's dissent in Jackson, supra note 1, at 396,
414, 421. See Siegel, "The Fallacies of Jackson v. Denno," 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 50, 51-52
(1964).
5 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
6 The dissent in Huntley, written by Judge Van Voorhis and concurred in by Judge
Scileppi, vigorously opposed the enlargement of the coram nobis remedy, arguing essentially
that if the federal courts have created the new need for review, then the federal courts
ought to do the reviewing themselves; New York has already given a complete remedy
to every defendant. Id. at 78, 81, 204 N.E.2d at 184, 185, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 844, 846.
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whether the confession was voluntary, it submitted the confession to the
jury which would determine its voluntariness as a question of fact."
In Jackson the United States Supreme Court, in holding the procedure
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, main-
tained that such a procedure permits the jury to see every statement
which is not involuntary as a matter of law-in effect, most confessions.'
Even if the jury decided that the statement was involuntary, it may still
in fact have considered the confession to be true, thus allowing the con-
fession, though involuntary, to affect the jury's determination of guilt or
innocence. The Court did not believe that the jury could remain unprej-
udiced in such a case because it would have already seen the disputed
statement.9
The Court apparently approved two alternative procedures, which are
known as the Orthodox or Wigmore method and the Massachusetts or
Humane method.Y Under the Orthodox method the trial court decides
whether the confession is voluntary or not, and, if it is, the court submits
the statement to the jury which determines its weight only (called at differ-
ent times: credibility, truthfulness, accuracy)." Under the Massachusetts
procedure, the court first determines for itself whether the statement is
voluntary. Then, finding it voluntary, it submits the statement to the
jury not only to determine its weight and accuracy, but to fully reconsider
the question of voluntariness. The jury can, on the same facts, overrule
the court's determination.'"
I
PROCEDURES FOR ANALOGOUS ISSUES
The question of the admissibility of a confession or of its voluntariness
was similar to, but carefully distinguished from, other questions in New
York procedure, namely, questions of fact, questions of law, preliminary
questions of fact, questions of admissibility of other evidence, and the
procedure established by the legislature on illegally obtained evidence.
Generally, a question of fact is for the jury to determine; a question of
law, for the judge; preliminary questions of fact, for the judge; and the
7 E.g., People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951); People v. Weiner, 248
N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441 (1928); People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927).
8 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 381 (1964).
9 Id. at 381-84, 386; see Meltzer, "Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Respon-
sibility Between Judge and Jury," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1954). The court relied much upon
Morgan, "Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions
of Fact," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929).
10 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8, at 378 & n.8.
11 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (3d ed. 1940).
12 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 8; Commonwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 88 N.E.2d
713 (1949); Wigmore, supra note 11, at § 861.
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admissibility of evidence or the competency of witnesses for the judge."3
In the matter of illegally obtained evidence, the legislature reserves to
the judge the primary role on a motion to suppress."
The procedure formerly employed by New York and that presently
used by Massachusetts-type jurisdictions for resolving the voluntariness
issue are unlike any of the above situations. Under either procedure, where
the voluntariness of a confession was in question, both the judge and the
jury played an essential, though not clearly defined, part. (Under the
Massachusetts procedure the jury has a less prominent role, but still equal
to that of the judge.) The Orthodox method for determining the voluntari-
ness of a confession, however, bears a significant resemblance to the pro-
cedure for determining the admissibility of ordinary evidence. When ob-
jection is made to certain evidence or to the competency of a witness, the
judge, who may conduct a voir dire or preliminary hearing, determines
once and for all that the evidence is admissible or that the witness is com-
petent. 5 The jury does not review this question, though it of course still
must determine whether the evidence thereby admitted is true or accurate.
The jury determines weight or credibility. On the confession issue the divi-
sion of responsibility is not as clear-cut in the New York or Massachusetts
procedures. In the former New York and the present Massachusetts
procedures the jury would determine both questions of voluntariness and
truthfulness, though in the Massachusetts procedure the judge must have
previously determined that the confession was voluntary. Under the Ortho-
dox method, however, the procedure is more familiar and regular. It is
the usual procedure of admissibility. The judge, by once and for all de-
termining that a confession is voluntary, admits the confession and the
jury thereafter performs its familiar function of determining the credi-
bility or weight to be given to the evidence thus admitted.'"
Another complicating factor distinguishing the former New York con-
fession procedure from the other situations mentioned is that up to the
present it appears that New York required the jury to be present dur-
ing the voir dire.'7 In all the other situations, including both civil and
criminal cases, where the judge takes testimony or other evidence to help
him determine a question of fact or admissibility, he has discretion to al-
'3 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 149, 419-20; 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice §§ 72,
73, at 512-13 (1953); Fisch, New York Evidence § 26 (1959); Richardson, Evidence
§§ 114-18 (9th ed. 1964). See generally, Morgan, supra note 9.
14 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 813-c to -e (Supp. 1964). See discussion infra.
15 See note 13 supra; 2 Wigmore, supra note 11, § 497(c).
16 See notes 10-11 supra.
17 People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 158, 87 N.E. 112, 116-17 (1909) (dictum); see
People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 54, 85 N.E. 809, 812 (1908).
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low the jury to remain or to excuse it." This issue will be discussed below
in connection with recommended future procedure.
II
Ti-E ESSENCE OF Jackson v. Denno
The Jackson decision has been severely attacked for not only unneces-
sarily raising a simple procedural matter which was not essentially unfair
to the heights of a due process question, but also for sanctioning a pro-
cedure (Massachusetts) which is different from the one condemned in
semantics alone.' 9 Mr. Justice Black in his dissent also viewed this de-
cision as an attack upon the guarantee of a trial by jury. The decision,
according to Mr. Justice Black, downgrades the jury and throws doubt
upon its reliability as a finder of fact °
That many cases decided under the former New York type of proce-
dure are indistinguishable from cases decided in Massachusetts-type juris-
dictions2 is no reason, however, to conclude that Jackson does not state
a sound and distinguishable rule. The gist of Jackson, in the opinion of
this writer, can be summed up in the word "separate." As long as some-
one or some distinct body other than the trial jury has made an independ-
ent determination, resolved fact issues, and concluded that the confession
is voluntary, then the possibility of prejudice to the accused has been re-
moved. Even should the jury confuse the question of voluntariness with
truthfulness under the Massachusetts procedure where it fully redeter-
mines the question of voluntariness, there has still been an independent
factual determination beforehand that the confession was voluntary.
III
QUESTION ANSWERED FOR NEW YORK By Huntley
Some of the procedural questions left open by Jackson were answered
by the New York conforming decree of People v. Huntley, but only "for
the present and tentatively . . . pending further development by the
courts or by the Legislature, or both."'  The defendant in Huntley was
denied leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals in April of 1962. After
18 N.Y. Rules Civ. Prac. § 164, abrogated by N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 10002 (no similar
provision exists in the CPLR, probably because the procedure is unquestioned); Fisch,
supra note 13, § 22.
'9 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 404-05 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 436-38
(Harlan, J., dissenting); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78, 204 N.E.2d 179, 184,
255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 844 (1965) (dissent); Siegel, supra note 4.
20 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 19, at 401, 405.
21 Compare the New York type procedure and charge in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 173-74 (1953), with cases in Massachusetts type jurisdictions, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 268 F.2d 416, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. Appleton, 152 Cal. App. 2d 235, 313
P.2d 154, 156-57 (1957).22 People v. Huntley, supra note 19, at 74, 204 N.E.2d at 181, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
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Jackson came down in June of 1964, Huntley sought a reconsideration of
his application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals held the Jackson
rule to be retroactive and applicable to every prior conviction.2 It dis-
tinguished People v. Muller'24 which denied reconsideration in a similar
case on an illegally obtained evidence or Mapp v. Ohio25 question. The
court further overruled as much of People v. Hovnaniani2 as was con-
trary. The Second Department in Hovnanian had held in part that
Jackson did not apply retroactively to a case which had exhausted its
regular appellate remedies. According to Huntley, the Jackson rule is to
be applied to cases in or out of the normal appellate process.
For those prisoners who have exhausted their normal appellate rem-
edies, the procedure to be used is coram nobis 7 This in fact repre-
sents a serious extension of the coram nobis remedy, which technically
had been limited to matters not in the record and not capable of being
raised in the normal appellate process28 Issues such as lack of counsel
at the pretrial stage could not be raised on coram nobis because de-
fendant's trial lawyer could have raised it at trial or on appeal.2 The
court rejected use of habeas corpus because of the requirement in section
7004(c) of the CPLR that the writ be returnable in the county where the
person is being detained. The court preferred these cases to be heard
in the counties of the original trial and preferably by the same judge
who presided at the trial. Notice was taken, however, of the possible en-
largement of the habeas corpus remedy under the CPLR.30
The procedure for handling these cases on appeal or on coram nobis
where the trial had been under the former New York rule is carefully laid
out in Huntley and few questions should arise on that procedure. 81 As
to future trials, the Court of Appeals chose the Massachusetts procedure
over the Orthodox.32 The reasons given by the court for this choice are
(1) that the New York constitutional guarantee of trial by jury requires
the Massachusetts procedure and (2) that giving the defendant two
chances on the question of voluntariness, before both judge and jury, is
23 Id. at 77, 204 N.E.2d at 182, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
24 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N..2d 99, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 850
(1963).
25 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 22 App. Div. 2d 686, 253 N.Y.S.2d 241 (2d Dep't 1964).
27 People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 76-77, 204 N.E.2d 179, 182-83, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838,
842-43 (1965).
28 Frank, Coram Nobis 96 (1953).
29 People v. Howard, 12 N.Y.2d 65, 187 N.E.2d 113, 236 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1962).
30 People v. Huntley, supra note 27; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 7002-03.
31 People v. Huntley, supra note 27, at 76-78, 204 N.E.2d at 182-83, 255 N.Y.S.2d at
842-43.
82 Id. at 78, 202 N.E.2d at 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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a more humane procedure. 3 The judge is to determine voluntariness be-
yond a reasonable doubt and make express findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. The People have the burden of proof to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. The confession is
then to be submitted to the jury which fully redetermines the question
of voluntariness on the same facts.34
The court did not go into great detail; however, it ought not to have
been any more detailed than necessary in such a pioneering decision in
establishing the method for properly raising and hearing the voluntariness
question. The court did rule that the prosecutor before trial is to notify the
defense whether any alleged confession or admission will be offered at
trial. The defense, if it intends to question the voluntariness of the con-
fession or admission must "notify the prosecutor of a desire by the defense
of a preliminary hearing on such issue (cf. Code Crim. Proc., § 813-c).) 3 5
IV
PARALLEL PROCEDURE: SUPPRESSION OF ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE
Thus the Court of Appeals cryptically pointed to the kind of procedure
it would probably like to see used, or at least tested. The court apparently
hopes that trial courts will by hit and miss decisions send up enough
interpretations of this directive to enable it to fashion from them a
fully satisfactory procedure. The reference to section 813-c of the Code
of Criminal Procedure is to the pretrial motion for suppression of ille-
gally obtained evidence which the legislature devised to comply with
the mandate of Mapp v. Ohio3 Using this small but significant lead as a
starting point, trial courts, district attorneys, and defense counsels can
with some measure of safety, develop their management of the volun-
tariness issue along the outline suggested by the various statutory and
case-law rules on the suppression of illegally obtained evidence." By
this simple and organized device, the questions left unanswered by
Huntley can be answered with something more than pure speculation,
though of course no more than "for the present and tentatively. '3 8
33 Ibid.
34 People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 77-78, 204 N.E.2d 179, 182-83, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838,
843 (1965).
35 Id. at 78, 202 N.E.2d at 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37 Previous to Huntley some trial courts had ruled that the pretrial procedure of N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 813-c could not be used as a device to obtain, before trial, rulings on the
admissibility of evidence not obtained by search or seizure. People v. Mitchell, 41 Misc.
2d 839, 247 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963); People v. Steenstra-Toussaint, 40
Misc. 2d 43, 242 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963). But see People v. Logan,
39 Misc. 2d 593, 241 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963).
38 Some rules, however, have already been determined differently, e.g., burden of proof
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The defense, upon being informed by the People that a confession or
admission may be introduced as evidence at trial should, with reasonable
diligence, if it intends to raise a question of voluntariness, make a motion
in the court having jurisdiction of the indictment, information, com-
plaint, or charge prior to the commencement of the trial to determine the
voluntariness of the alleged confession or statement.39 The objection to a
confession would be waived unless raised before commencement of the
trial4" except where (1) defendant was unaware of the existence of a con-
fession or statement, or (2) defendant, though aware of the confession
before trial, had obtained information that it was coerced only after trial
has begun, or (3) the defendant had not had adequate time or opportunity
to make the motion before trial.41 In only these situations should de-
fendant be allowed to raise the question for the first time at trial."
The hearing should be held by the court without a jury, whether on
pretrial motion or on motion during trial. If the motion is made at trial the
jury is to be excused while the court hears evidence on the motion as it
would on a pretrial motion.' A hearing on a pretrial motion should
be completed before trial begins, except in cases of misdemeanors and
offenses where the court may entertain such motions during the trial,
according to the rule of the court or the discretion of the judge before
whom the motion is made.4 Unless it is established that defendant has
obtained additional evidence of coercion after a pretrial motion has been
determined, the determination of such motion should be binding on the
trial court. 5
The hearing on a confession's voluntariness, whether pretrial or at trial,
should be a quasi-formal hearing, that is, a record should be kep 6 and
the judge should clearly express therein his resolution of the issues of
fact 7 and his determination that the confession was involuntary or that
is on the People in the voluntariness question, but in search and seizure it is on defendant
to sustain his claim of illegally obtained evidence. See, e.g., People v. Boyle, 39 Misc. 2d 917,
242 N.Y.S.2d 90 (City Ct. Port Jervis 1963).
39 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(1), 813-e (Supp. 1964). See generally Fisch,
supra note 13, chs. 20, 25 (Supp. 1964) ; Richardson, supra note 13, ch. 6.
40 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 813-d(4) (Supp. 1964).
41 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(1) (Supp. 1964).
42 Cf. People v. McCall, 19 App. Div. 2d 630, 241 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1963). This
rule, of course, should not be strictly enforced until defense counsel have become familiar
with it or until it is adopted by some court in proper circumstances.
43 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(3) (Supp. 1964).
44 Ibid.
45 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-d(2) (Supp. 1964).
46 Cf. People v. Entrialgo, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1963);
People v. Del Giorno, 19 App. Div. 2d 849, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (4th Dep't 1963).
47 People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 77-78, 204 N.E.2d 179, 183, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 843
(1965); cf. People v. Lombardi, 18 App. Div. 2d 177, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't), aff'd,
13 N.Y.2d 1014, 195 N.E.2d 306, 245 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1963).
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it was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.48 But the usual rules of
evidence, such as the hearsay rule, should not be strictly applied and the
judge should be given wide discretion in conducting the hearing.49
Defendant should have no right to appeal from a determination finding
the confession voluntary,5 ° but can have it reviewed on the regular ap-
peal from a judgment of conviction.51 The People, however, should be
allowed in certain cases to appeal directly from a pretrial order finding
the confession involuntary; for example, where there would be no case
against the defendant without the confession. 2
This motion should not be allowed to prevent an allegedly involun-
tary confession from being presented to the grand jury, since should
an indictment be returned, such evidence may be challenged by the pre-
trial motion available to defendant by the suggested procedure. 53
A finding that a confession is involuntary should also result in the ex-
clusion of the "fruits" of the confession. 4 Nor would there be a re-
quirement of standing, but any person who has reasonable grounds for
believing that a confession or any evidence obtained by the help of that
confession is to be used against him should be able to make a pretrial
motion to determine its voluntariness.55
The philosophy, common sense, and practical reasons which caused
the above rules to be applied in motions to suppress illegally obtained
evidence are as compelling in the area of involuntary confessions.55 The
adoption of these rules would not only be appropriate for the confession
procedure, but would also offer some degree of symmetry and familiarity
to the courts and its officers who are burdened enough as it is with
48 People v. Huntley, supra note 47.
49 Cf. People v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721, remittitur
amended, 13 N.Y.2d 726, 191 N.E.2d 910, 241 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1963).
50 Cf. People v. Oliver, 38 Misc. 2d 320, 238 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Oneida County Ct. 1963).
51 Ibid. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 19 App. Div. 2d 809, 243 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1st Dep't 1963).
52 Cf. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 518 (Supp. 1964).
53 Cf. Hochhauser v. O'Connor, 33 Misc. 2d 92, 223 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1961); People v. Maiorello, 31 Misc. 2d 981, 222 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961).
54 Cf. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
56 Cf. People v. Smith, 35 Misc. 2d 533, 230 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Kings County Ct. 1962);
People v. Cocchiara, 31 Misc. 2d 495, 221 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961); Richardson,
Evidence, supra note 13, § 145, at 117-18. California follows this liberal rule on motion to
suppress illegally obtained evidence. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
56 1 do not think, however, that the federal rule in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954), which allows evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure to be admitted to
impeach defendant should be followed. Such a rule in the case of confessions would, by
informing the jury of the confession, defeat much of the object sought by excluding involun-
tary confessions.
I also believe that the rule of People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E.2d 538 (1916),
which permits a defendant who testifies on the voluntariness issue to be cross examined on
the merits of the case, should not be followed. This rule will be less damaging today since
preliminary hearings will probably be had outside the hearing of the jury, but it still is
a hindrance to the defendant. See Richardson, supra note 13, § 334-b, at 319.
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the ever-increasing constitutional mandates being issued by the energetic
United States Supreme Court.
VI
MASSACHUSETTS VERSUS ORTHODOX PROCEDURE
The main reason given by the New York Court of Appeals in Huntley
for its preference for the Massachusetts method, namely, the New York
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,5 7 is somewhat confusing. First
of all, it is evident that the better procedure would be to exclude the
jury during the preliminary hearing.58 Though New York courts have
until recently assumed that juries had to be present during the pre-
liminary hearing on the voluntariness of a, confession,59 no case has
held this to be a requirement, and certainly none have held it to be con-
stitutionally required.60 On the other hand, when objections, including
constitutional ones, were made against excluding the jury from a prelimi-
nary hearing on the question of the competency of a dying declaration,
the courts properly overruled such objections pointing out that juries
might be prejudiced if they heard all the facts surrounding the declaration,
and that the jury would be confused by all the preliminary questions they
would have to decide.61 The courts distinguished the question of the ad-
missibility of a dying declaration from the admissibility of a confession on
the ground that in the latter situation a jury had to be present since it had
the sole responsibility of determining whether the confession was volun-
tary.62
After Jackson, the jury no longer has sole responsibility for determining
the voluntariness of a confession, and that issue can be treated in the
same manner as is the admissibility of a dying declaration. The judge, by
57 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
58 Nearly all states excuse the jury during the preliminary hearing and it would probably
be held error if the jury were present during a voir dire after which the court found the
confession involuntary. Annot., 148 A.L.R. 546, 549 (1944). But several states and federal
circuits under both the Orthodox and Massachusetts procedures have stated that it is not
error to have the jury present. E.g., Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963) (Orthodox or Massachusetts); Smith v. United
States, 268 F.2d 416, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1959); Denny v. United States, 151 F.2d 828, 833
(4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946); People v. Childers, 315 P.2d 480, 482
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Tipton v. State, 111 Fla. 830, 150 So. 243 (1933); State v.
Fiumara, 110 NJ.L. 164, 164 AUt. 490, 491 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933); Jamerson v. State,
47 Okla. Crim. 112, 287 Pac. 775, 776 (1930).
59 People v. DePinna, 18 App. Div. 2d 681 (2d Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision).
Trial courts have, since Huntley, been hearing pretrial motions on voluntariness without
juries.
60 People v. Brasch, 193 N.Y. 46, 54, 85 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1908) (held permissible to
have jury present during voir dire); People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 158, 87 N.E. 112,
116-17 (1909) (in dictum stated that the jury was required to be present).
61 E.g., People v. Smith, 104 N.Y. 491, 10 N.E. 873 (1887) (not error to either allow
jury to be present or to excuse it); People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915).
62 Ibid. See People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 75-76, 160 N.E.2d 26, 30-31, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465,
470-71 (1959).
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himself, once and for all may determine the confession's voluntariness and
then, if voluntary, submits it to the jury who determines its weight-in
short, the Orthodox method. The admission of a dying declaration may be
as damaging as the admission of a confession, yet it has been held that sole
determination by the judge of the admissibility of a dying declaration is
not a violation of the guarantee of trial by jury."
Furthermore, the twenty-three American jurisdictions which em-
ploy the Orthodox method 4also have constitutional guarantees of trial
by jury,'5 yet have no problem reconciling such a guarantee with the
Orthodox method. It is difficult to understand why the Court of Appeals
should have such a problem.
As a practical matter also, Mr. Justice Black made a very convincing
observation when he stated that the jury in a Massachusetts-type juris-
diction which receives the confession from the judge with his "imprimatur"
of voluntariness on it, is hardly in any different position from the jury in
an Orthodox type state which receives a confession with a "final" finding
of voluntariness. Each in effect has only the weight or credibility of the
confession to determine.66
With such little difference between the Massachusetts and Orthodox
procedures, why should the Orthodox be adopted in New York? It ap-
pears to this writer that the use of the Massachusetts procedure in New
York would in effect vitiate the purpose of Jackson. The gist of Jackson
was to have a separate and independent factual determination of the
voluntariness question by a person or body other than the trial jury. The
procedure which New York followed before Jackson is very similar to
the Massachusetts procedure. 67 The only adjustments New York trial
courts need to make are: (1) to state for the record on admitting a con-
fession that it is voluntary as a matter of fact, the fact issues involved
having been decided against the accused and (2) perhaps to exclude the
jury. The inevitable temptation which this hardly significant change has
for the trial judge is obvious: he will employ the same standards he used
before Jackson in determining admissibility and leave the real burden of
deciding whether a confession is voluntary or not upon the jury as pre-
viously. Thus, instead of actually resolving factual disputes in the evidence
63 Ibid.
64 For listing and cases, see Appendix of majority and Appendices A-I and B-I of
Justice Black in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 369, 411, 421 (1924); Siegel, "The Fallacies
of Jackson v. Denno," 31 Brooklyn L. Rev. 50, 52 n.9 (1964).
65 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 864-65 & n.1 (8th ed. 1927); Columbia University
Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Index Digest of State Constitution 579 (1959).
66 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 64, at 404-05 (Black, J., dissenting).
67 Justice Harlan in dissent in Jackson, as did Justice Black, supra note 64, saw the
difference between the Massachusetts procedure and the New York procedure as a matter of
semantics only. Id. at 436-38.
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on voluntariness one way or the other, he will pass the question on to the
jury whenever a dispute arises and the confession was not obviously in-
voluntary. If New York courts are merely asked to shift slightly so as to
adjust to the Massachusetts procedure, then the New York Court of Ap-
peals will probably have ostensibly complied with Jackson while avoiding
its mandate.
A further reason for adopting the Orthodox method is that there will
be less doubt as to the applicability of the rules described above which
are presently employed in the procedure for handling the suppression of
illegally obtained evidence where the judge has sole responsibility.
In summary, while the New York Court of Appeals in Huntley has
established some rules for handling the Jackson-voluntariness question,
trial courts and attorneys, provided the legislature does not act first,
should adopt, for the sake of symmetry and familiarity, the rules es-
tablished for the suppression of illegally obtained evidence, except where
contrary rules are already in force. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
should reconsider its tentative adoption of the Massachusetts procedure
and instead adopt the Orthodox procedure which will assure compliance
with the essential rule of Jackson and better allow familiar procedures to
be employed.
1965]
